



Young Jewish Europeans: perceptions and experiences of antisemitism



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Institute for
Jewish Policy Research

Young Jewish Europeans: perceptions and experiences of antisemitism

Preface

Jewish life has been an intrinsic part of Europe for many centuries and, tragically, so has Jew-hatred. In recent years, antisemitism has been on the rise once again. When looking into how Jewish Europeans see their future in Europe in the current climate, the obvious people to ask are the young.

This report is a direct result of our fruitful dialogue with the youth and their organisations such as the European Union of Jewish Students. It presents the experiences and perceptions of antisemitism of young Jewish Europeans and helps us as policy makers to understand the challenges faced by them in Europe today.

This report sheds light on the fact that young Jewish Europeans are more exposed to antisemitic incidents than their elders. But it also shows their strong Jewish identity and their resilience. I want to ensure that Jews in Europe can continue to express their identity freely and feel safe in their daily life.

The European Commission is determined to respond to the rising challenge of antisemitism and mobilise the European Parliament and the Member States to take action.

The recent Council Declaration on Antisemitism is an important commitment by all EU Member States to fight antisemitism in all its forms and to protect Jewish communities.

Yet, this report shows that more needs to be done. I trust that the expert working group on antisemitism will produce tangible results on the ground and ensure that the Jewish community – young and old – thrive and see their future in Europe!

Pushing back on antisemitic prejudices means standing up *for* our democracy and *for* an open, diverse society. This is the Europe in which we all want to live!

Věra Jourová
*European Commissioner for Justice,
Consumers and Gender Equality*



Foreword

What is the future of Jewish life in Europe? This report, which relays the experiences and perceptions of Jewish Europeans between the ages of 16 and 34, provides reasons for concern.

The continent's Jewish population has long been in demographic decline. But that decline is at risk of accelerating. Among the over 2,700 young people who participated in the EU Fundamental Rights Agency's second large-scale survey on Jewish people's experiences, 4 out of 10 say they have considered emigrating because they do not feel safe as Jews.

This is deeply troubling – though not completely surprising in light of many of their experiences across the EU. Just over 80 % of the young Jews surveyed say that antisemitism is a problem in their country, and believe it has grown in the past five years. They see the internet and social media as particularly hostile environments – but face problems in public places, too.

The young Jews surveyed indicated encountering harassment at higher rates than older generations: 44 % say they were targeted at least once in the year before the survey. Yet startlingly few report such incidents, with 80 % opting not to do so. To protect themselves, many avoid wearing or carrying items that may identify them as Jewish.

These findings make for grim reading. We must fight antisemitism more effectively by tackling it at its roots, no matter how difficult that is. Both educational and criminal law measures can play an important role. We hope this report encourages policymakers to intensify their efforts in these areas.

Michael O'Flaherty
*Director of the European Union
Agency for Fundamental Rights*

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Introduction and key findings

Having been part of European life for hundreds of years and contributed in many ways to the construction of Europe's cultural, political, economic and social fabric, Europe's Jewish population has now been in a state of numerical decline for a century and a half. Decimated by genocide and driven away by persecution, poverty and the promise of a better life elsewhere, the surviving remnant now constitutes less than 10 % of the world's Jewish population, down from 90 % of the total in the second half of the nineteenth century. Moreover, Jewish Europeans today are disproportionately old – their age structure is top heavy – and while precise age distributions remain uncertain at a continental level, relatively few are part of the generation of young adults.

Nevertheless, over a million Jews live within the countries of the European Union (EU) today, most notably in France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Hungary. The young adults among them constitute a vibrant, well-educated group, with strong roots in Europe and strong attachments to the countries in which they live. With close to 80 % of them born in the European countries where they currently reside, and almost 90 % holding citizenships of those countries, Europe's young Jews are very much part of Europe, much like their forebears.

This study focuses on these young adults, defined here as those aged between 16 and 34 years, frequently contrasting them with two other age bands (35-59-year-olds and 60-plus year-olds) to identify similarities and differences (see the [Annex](#) for details). Its particular interest in young adults is because they represent the future of Europe's Jews. They are the generation that has grown up and come of age both in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, and in a context that has seen resurgent antisemitism in different parts of Europe, sometimes from the far-right, sometimes the far-left, and sometimes in the form of Islamist terrorism. In many respects, they hold the keys to the future of Jewish life in Europe, as well as to the possibility of creating and maintaining a unique European form of Judaism and to the potential of bringing the best of Jewish tradition, culture and insight to help build the Europe of tomorrow. The decisions they take – not least, whether to remain in Europe and be part of the project to strengthen it, or to leave Europe out of fears for their safety as Jews – will speak volumes about the nature of Europe and its ability to absorb and respect cultural difference.

The EU and its Member States are required by law to do everything in their power to combat antisemitism effectively and to safeguard the dignity of the Jewish People. Yet as two recent surveys of discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU, both conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), clearly show, the persistence and prevalence of antisemitism hinder people's ability to live openly Jewish lives, free from fears for their security

and well-being.¹ The second of these surveys focused on the experiences and perceptions of antisemitism among Jews living in twelve EU Member States – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It was the largest study ever conducted among Jews in Europe, and was undertaken by a consortium of the UK-based Institute for Jewish Policy Research and the international research agency, Ipsos. This follow-up report, which focuses specifically on the young Jewish Europeans within that dataset, was written for FRA by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

The study demonstrates that young Jewish Europeans are able to practice their Judaism reasonably freely: high proportions report celebrating Passover and fasting on the major Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) and having strong Jewish identities. However, much like their parents and grandparents, the memory of the Holocaust looms large within their identities, alongside their connections to Jews both near and far – to their families, to Israel, and to the Jewish People as a whole. Belief in God plays a less important role for them. While higher proportions of young Jewish Europeans report having a stronger religious identity than the older two cohorts, for many, their Judaism is about being part of a people, a culture and a civilisation, with a long history and a strong moral code.

Yet in spite of their deep roots in Europe and their general ability to participate in Jewish life, they see a great deal of antisemitism around them. Four in five believe antisemitism to be a problem in their countries, and the same proportion believes the problem to have deteriorated in recent years. They feel similarly about racism in general, and indeed, intolerance towards Muslims. Many see antisemitism in the media, in political life and on the street, and almost all see it online and on social media – it is in these contexts that most consider it to be an existing and growing problem.

Moreover, young Jewish Europeans are considerably more likely than either of the other two older cohorts to experience antisemitism. Remarkably, close to half of this sample of young Jewish Europeans said they had experienced at least one antisemitic incident in the previous twelve months. While most of these incidents involved harassment rather than violence, the figures paint a portrait of a community living in a context imbued with regular doses of antisemitic hostility. On occasion, this hostility spills over into violence:

¹ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2013), *Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism*, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union (Publications Office); and FRA (2018), *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism: Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU*, Luxembourg, Publications Office. See also GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, ZA7491 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.13264.

4 % of the young Jewish Europeans surveyed said they had experienced a physical antisemitic attack in the previous year, and about half of these were not reported to the police or any other authority.

Many of these incidents were perpetrated by a 'teenager or group of teenagers,' or a 'colleague from work or school/college'. This raises a question about the extent to which this is happening within the university sector – 56 % of the young Jewish Europeans in this sample were at school or university in the year prior to the survey. In many cases, antisemitism has a distinctly ideological flavour: young Jews report that one third of all cases of antisemitic harassment, and over half of the cases of antisemitic violence they have experienced in the past year, were perpetrated by 'someone with a Muslim extremist view'. About one in five point to 'someone with a left-wing political view', and about one in seven to 'someone with a 'right-wing political view'. Elevated levels of antisemitic sentiment among these three groups have been found in existing research.²

The place of Israel within antisemitism is often contested, particularly concerning where the line should be drawn between reasonable and legitimate criticism of its government, and clear and indisputable antisemitic prejudice. Yet taken as a whole, young Jews are quite clear on this: most reject the notion that general criticism of Israel is antisemitic and, indeed, are more likely to do so than the older two cohorts. But sizeable majorities clearly believe it becomes so when manifested in particular ways – for example, in boycotts of Israel or Israelis and, even more so, in drawing comparisons between Israelis and Nazis.

More generally, the Arab-Israel conflict clearly affects their feelings of safety as Jews. Nine in ten of the young Jewish Europeans in the sample report that it affects their feelings of security to some degree at least. Close to four in ten say it does 'a great deal'. Four in five say that people in their countries accuse or blame them for anything done by the Israeli government, at least occasionally; for a quarter of young Jewish Europeans, this happens 'all the time'. This is a phenomenon affecting Jews of all ages, but again, younger Jews are found to be most likely to experience it.

Understanding Jewish sensitivities to these issues is essential to combating antisemitism today. Israel matters to many young Jewish Europeans. Nine in ten have been there, and three quarters have family or relatives living there. Close to 20 % have lived there for at least a year of their lives or were born there. But the connection runs much deeper. For three-quarters of those in our sample, Israel constitutes an important part of their Jewish identities – it is part of what they understand their Jewishness to be about. Thus,

attacks on Israel – certainly particularly hostile ones with clear resonances of antisemitic canards – feel personal and prejudicial. In Jewish terms, Israel is the cradle of Jewish civilisation, the place from which Jews were expelled two thousand years ago and yearned to return to throughout the following centuries until the establishment of the modern State of Israel in 1948. That story of dispersal and return, especially bearing in mind the long history of prejudice, discrimination and genocide Jews experienced in the interim, particularly in Europe, has a significant bearing on Jewish self-understanding today.

Given this reality, alongside their perceptions and experiences of antisemitism today, it is unsurprising to find evidence of anxiety among young Jewish Europeans. While they are more likely than the older two cohorts to wear, carry or display items that indicate that they are Jewish, they are also more likely than them to refrain from doing so. This seeming paradox indicates two elements of contemporary Europe. On the one hand, the efforts that have been made in many Member States to protect the fundamental rights of minorities appears to have given some young Jews the confidence to express their Jewishness in public. On the other hand, the tensions that exist around minority rights, immigration, and particularly the Arab-Israel conflict, sometimes create a context in which significant proportions of young Jews feel compelled to hide their Jewishness out of fears for their safety.

At present, the numbers of Jewish Europeans emigrating from Europe because they feel unsafe in their countries are fairly low and stable – with the most obvious exception of France, where recent counts have been much higher than average. Yet there is also evidence of significant recent increases from Belgium and Italy. As is the case with migration in general, it tends to be younger people who take this step than older ones. Moreover, four in ten of the young Jewish Europeans in this sample say they have considered emigrating from the countries in which they live because of their fears for their safety as Jews. Of these, a third say they have made active plans to do so – most to Israel. While actual migration figures suggest that not all will act on these plans, these data are clearly indicative of the levels of concern, or perhaps resignation, felt by many young Jews in Europe today. Few feel enough is being done by their governments to combat antisemitism effectively today, although they are more likely to acknowledge the efforts their governments are making to respond to the security needs of Jewish communities.

These findings ought to give pause for thought for policymakers across the EU and provide them with evidence to refine existing, or devise new, courses of action to prevent and counter antisemitism. The findings are also relevant to civil society organisations concerned with ensuring the security of Jewish communities or with preventing and fighting antisemitism, as well as those working towards supporting fair and just societies.

² See, for example, Staetsky, L. D. (2017), *Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain. A study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel*, London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research and Community Security Trust.



1

Who are young Jewish Europeans?



KEY FINDINGS

- 77 % of the young Jewish Europeans surveyed were born in the country in which they currently live, and 89 % of them hold citizenship of that country.
- Young Jewish Europeans are less likely than older Jewish respondents to have strong attachments to their country, their region, the European Union or to Israel. They show lower levels of trust than their elders in their country's legal system or parliament, but higher levels of trust in the European Parliament.
- 81 % of the young Jewish Europeans surveyed score highly on a scale measuring the strength of their Jewish identity: 7+ on a scale from 1 (low) to 10 (high). In contrast, 35 % report a similar score on a strength of religiosity scale.
- Levels and types of Jewish religious practice among young Jewish Europeans are very similar to those found among the older age groups; if anything, younger Jews are more likely than their elders to observe common Jewish practices.

1.1. National and European attachments

Most young Jewish Europeans surveyed were born and raised within Europe. Over three-quarters were born in the EU Member State in which they presently reside, and over 80 % in total were born in an EU Member State (Figure 1). Of the remainder, the largest definable group is comprised of those born in Israel: 4 % were born there, which is unsurprising given that Israel is home to the largest Jewish population in the world.

In most cases (59 %), their parents were born in the same country as them, although about 20 % have at least one parent born either elsewhere in the EU, or in Israel or the United States. A similar proportion has at least one parent born elsewhere. In many instances, these are likely to be young German Jews whose parents moved from the Former Soviet Union after the collapse of communism. In some others,

they are French Jews whose parents moved to France from North Africa in the 1950s and 1960s (Figure 2). These two Jewish communities contain rather large proportions of relatively recent migrants. Other communities, notably in the United Kingdom and Hungary, are largely comprised of Jews with rather longer family histories in the countries. Yet, overall, it is striking to note that in excess of 40 % of young Jewish Europeans have at least one parent who was born abroad. Parental links with Israel are also worthy of note. For one in twenty young Jewish Europeans, their mother was born there; for one in fourteen, their father was – both considerably higher proportions than those found among the older two age bands.


89 % of young Jewish Europeans hold citizenship of the countries in which they currently reside. They are also more likely than the older two cohorts to hold a citizenship of another country, irrespective of whether it is of another EU Member State, Israel, or the United

States. Israel stands out most in this regard: 10 % of the young group in the sample holds Israeli citizenship, either alone or as one of two or more citizenships.

Compared to the older two cohorts, young Jewish Europeans are less likely to feel attached to the

countries in which they live. Yet we find much the same with regard to their attachments to any of the locations investigated – not just to their home country, but also to their region, the European Union or Israel (Figure 3). In every case, we find a correlation with age: the older Jews are, the more likely they are to


Figure 1: Birthplaces of Jewish Europeans, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: G16a. Where were you born? Please select one option. Response options as listed.

Source: FRA, Survey on Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in the EU 2018, GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, ZA7491 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.13264 (hereafter referred to as 'GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019')


Figure 2: Birthplaces of respondents' mothers, by age band (%)^{a,b}



Notes: ^a Question: G16a. Where was your mother born? Please select one option. 1. [COUNTRY]; 2. Another EU Member State; 3. Israel; 4. The United States of America; 5. Other [TEXT BOX]; 95. Don't know; 96. Prefer not to say.

^b The proportions for the birthplaces of respondents' fathers are more or less identical in each case.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Figure 3: Proportions of Jewish Europeans in three age bands with strong attachments to their country, region, the European Union and Israel (%)^{a,b}

Notes: ^a Question: Go8g. People may feel different levels of attachment to their region, to the country where they live, or to the European Union. On a scale from 1 to 5 when 1 = “not at all attached” and 5 = “very strongly attached”, to what extent do you feel attached to each of the following? A. [COUNTRY]; B. The region where you live; C. The European Union; D. Israel.

^b Strong = levels 4 or 5 on the 5-point scale.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

feel a strong degree of attachment to each. Among all age bands, strong attachments to their home country and to Israel are most common; only about half as many feel a similar level of attachment to the European Union.

Making direct comparisons between Jews and the general population of Europe is complicated by the fact that, while Eurobarometer surveys investigate the same issues, they commonly use a different scale to do so. However, broadly speaking, one can say that young Jewish Europeans largely resemble young Europeans in general insofar as their levels of attachment to their countries and regions are found to be rather higher than their attachments to the European Union. Indeed, the most recent data on attachment to the European Union specifically indicate that the proportions feeling attached or unattached among young Jewish Europeans and young Europeans in general are remarkably similar.³ Much the same can be said for their attachments to country and region – again, the results appear to be very alike.

Rather like their attachments, young Jewish Europeans’ levels of trust in national institutions appear to be higher than their levels of trust in European ones,

as shown in Figure 4. However, it is striking to note that the trajectories across the generations move in different directions. Whereas smaller proportions of young Jews show high levels of trust in their countries’ legal systems or parliaments than the older two cohorts, the reverse is the case with regard to the European Parliament. The proportionate differences are small, but noteworthy nonetheless, and may point to a change over time, with trust levels possibly shifting away from nation and towards Europe.


1.2. Jewish attachments

It is clear that, in most cases, the respondents’ Jewishness is important to them. Given the opportunity to self-assess the strength of their Jewish identities on a scale of one to ten (where 1 = weak and 10 = strong), over half scored 9 or 10, and four in five scored seven or more. Young Jewish Europeans did not differ from 35-59-year-olds or those aged 60-plus in this regard – the scores for all three groups were strikingly similar (Figure 5).

However, this does not necessarily mean that they are religious: having a strong Jewish identity does not necessarily equate with being religiously active or observant. Indeed, invited to measure their degree of religiosity in the same manner, only one in seven

³ See Eurobarometer 90.3, QD1a.3, 8-22 November 2018, downloaded from <https://data.europa.eu> on 16 May 2019.

Figure 4: High/complete levels of trust in national and European institutions among Jewish Europeans, by age band (%)^{a,b}



Notes: ^a Question: Go8h. On a scale of 0-10, how much do you personally trust each of the [COUNTRY] institutions, where 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. A. [COUNTRY]'s parliament; B. [COUNTRY]'s legal system; C. The European Parliament.

^b Proportions shown for those who scored 7-10 on scale.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

young Jewish Europeans scored nine or ten, and only one in three scored seven or more (Figure 6). However, some distinction can be seen in this regard between them and the other age cohorts – the youngest age band is found to be the most religious of the three age bands analysed, more so than 35-59-year-olds who, in turn, are found to be more religious than the 60-plus. It is distinctly possible that this finding reflects a demographic change occurring in the United Kingdom in particular, as well as in Belgium, which both have strong and growing Orthodox Jewish populations that have considerably younger age profiles than other parts of the Jewish population.

Examining this through the lens of specific Jewish practices provides further clarity. The pattern of younger Jews being slightly more practising than older ones stands in most cases (Figure 7). However, the most commonly observed traditions – for example, attending a Passover seder and fasting on the major Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement) – involve lower levels of religious commitment than the least commonly observed – for example, not switching on lights on the Sabbath (due to the Jewish legal prohibition of using electricity on those days) or attending synagogue weekly or more often. A Passover seder takes place once or twice a year, and involves a family or collective meal, so serves a social and cultural function as well as a religious one. Fasting on Yom Kippur is similarly a once per annum event. Many Jews maintain these customs more out of a sense of a general connection to their Jewish identity,

rather than any sense of strict religious obligation. So while young Jews are again found to be rather more religiously observant than the two older cohorts, the overarching impression from the chart is that they are actually very similar to them in terms of the practices they are most and least likely to observe. The small distinctions seen fail to mask the overriding impression that young Jewish Europeans practice their Judaism in remarkably similar ways to the two older cohorts.

Likewise, they differ little from older age bands in terms of what matters to them about their Jewishness – the proportions are rather similar in most instances. Yet young Jewish Europeans appear to place a little more emphasis on ‘sharing Jewish festivals with my family’ and ‘believing in God’ than those in the oldest age band, and slightly less emphasis on ‘supporting Israel’ (Figure 8).

Turning to the more fundamental area of Jewish status, the overwhelming majority (85 %) of young European Jews in the sample were born Jewish. That proportion is supplemented by an additional 10 % who converted to Judaism at some point. The remainder are unclear about their Jewish status. Over a quarter report that either their mother or their father was not born Jewish. In most of these cases, their non-Jewish parent did not convert to Judaism, so we can assume that these respondents were brought up in a mixed-faith family. While significant proportions of this age band are not yet married, among those who are, over a quarter are married to non-Jewish partners. A further 7 % of


them are married to a convert to Judaism. It is highly probable that these proportions differ substantially by country, but such analysis is not part of this study.

This profile of the Jewishness of young respondents and their families is almost identical to that of the middle age-band (35-59-year olds). The real contrast is between these two age bands and the oldest one (60+ year olds), who are considerably more likely to

have been born Jewish (90 %), and considerably more likely to have had a Jewish-born mother (87 %) and/or a Jewish-born father (also 87 %). However, even among the oldest age band, we find that proportions with non-Jewish spouses (30 %) are more or less identical to the two younger bands.

Indicators of whether the Jewish identities of young Jewish Europeans are shifting over time can be seen

Figure 5: Strength of Jewish identity of Jewish Europeans, by age band (%)^{a,b}




Notes: ^a Question: G08f. Please position yourself on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 according to the strength of your Jewish identity, where 1 means very low strength and 10 means very high strength.

^b Ns = 2,683 (16-34); 6,605 (35-59); 6,970 (60+).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Figure 6: Degree of religiosity of Jewish Europeans, by age band (%)^{a,b}



Notes: ^a Question: G08a. How religious would you say you are? Please position yourself on a scale ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 means not religious at all and 10 means very religious.


^b A small number of respondents recorded 'Don't know' and have been removed from the analysis; Ns = 2,682 (16-34); 6,591 (35-59); 6,937 (60+).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

in Figure 9. It explores any contrasts between the type of Jewishness they experienced growing up, and the type they associate with today. Significant growth can be seen in the proportions identifying as Reform/Progressive (i.e. liberal in their levels and ways of Jewish practice) and, to a lesser extent, as Orthodox (i.e. practising Judaism in accordance with halacha – Jewish law). But the largest increase

can be seen among those self-identifying as ‘Just Jewish,’ suggesting broad association with their Jewishness in general, rather than with any particular denominational type. A slight decline can be seen among the ‘Traditional’ group (commonly understood as mainstream modern Orthodox – i.e. general adherence to halacha alongside full participation in and engagement with wider society).

Figure 7: Jewish practices of Jewish Europeans, by age band (%)^a




Note: ^a Question: Go8b. Which of the following Jewish practices do you personally observe? Please select all that apply to you. 1. Attend Passover seder most or all years; 2. Do not switch on lights on the Sabbath; 3. Attend synagogue weekly or more often; 4. Eat only kosher meat at home; 5. Light candles most Friday nights; 6. Fast on Yom Kippur most or all years; 7. None of these; 95. Don't know.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019




Figure 8: Importance of different elements of Jewishness to respondents' Jewish identities, by age band (%)^{a,b}



Notes: ^a Question: Go8e. How important are the following items to your sense of Jewish identity (items as listed in chart)?
^b Proportions shown reflect those who said the items were either 'very important' or 'fairly important' to their sense of Jewish identity.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019


Figure 9: Comparison between the Jewish identification patterns of young Jewish Europeans during their upbringing and the present (%)^{a,b}



Notes: ^a 16-34-year-old respondents (n=2,707).
^b Questions: Go8i. Which of the following comes closest to describing the Jewish upbringing that you had as a child? and Go8d. Which of the following comes closest to describing your current Jewish identity? (items as listed in the figure; 'I was not raised in a Jewish family' not included in Go8d because not applicable).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Figure 10: Proportions of Jewish Europeans thinking particular statements are either 'definitely' or 'probably' antisemitic, by age band (%)^{a,b,c}



Notes: ^a Question: B15b. Would you consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she says that: (items as listed in the figure)? ;
^b Question: B17. Would you consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she: (items as listed in the figure)?
^c Answers include both 'yes, definitely' and 'yes, probably'.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019



2

Defining antisemitism and understanding the place of Israel in it



KEY FINDINGS

- Tropes most likely to be regarded as antisemitic by young Jewish Europeans include those relating to Holocaust denial or trivialisation, as well as those suggesting nefarious uses of power by Jews or that Jews bring antisemitism on themselves. At least 90 % of young Jewish Europeans maintain that non-Jews expressing such ideas are either 'definitely' or 'probably' antisemitic. The proportions in the older age bands holding the same views are more or less identical.
- Israel features strongly in the lives of young Jewish Europeans. 89 % of those surveyed have visited the country and 76 % have family or relatives living there. 73 % regard 'supporting Israel' as important to their sense of Jewish identity.
- Young Jewish Europeans surveyed indicate at higher rates than older Jewish respondents that people in their countries accuse or blame them for anything done by the Israeli government. Over half (52 %) say this happens to them 'all the time' or 'frequently'.
- While most young Jewish Europeans (66 %) do not believe that criticism of Israeli government policy is antisemitic, most believe it becomes so when manifested in particular ways. 70 % say that boycotts of Israel or Israelis are either 'definitely' or 'probably' antisemitic, and 80 % hold the same position regarding the claim that 'Israelis behave like Nazis towards Palestinians'.

2.1. What is antisemitism?

There are ongoing discussions about how best to define antisemitism. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition, while not adopted or endorsed by all EU Member States and only actively implemented by some, remains the most widely used, particularly for the purposes of helping law-enforcement agencies determine whether or not to classify a particular incident as antisemitic. ⁴ FRA's survey examined this issue by asking respondents whether or not they consider particular ideas to be antisemitic. The results are presented in [Figure 10](#).


In the case of several such ideas, there is a considerable degree of consensus both within each age band and

across them. Holocaust denial or trivialisation, as well as the idea that Jews exploit the Holocaust for their own purposes, are regarded as antisemitic by about nine in ten of all Jews, irrespective of age. Given that over half of Europe's Jews were murdered on European soil during the Holocaust, such expressions are not simply offensive; they are antisemitic in Jewish eyes, and there is close to unanimity among young Jewish Europeans on this. Similarly, there is widespread consensus around ideas such as not considering Jews in a given European country to be nationals of that country, or Jews having 'too much power' in their country. These notions of Jews as foreigners, lacking in loyalty or using whatever power or influence they have for immoral purposes, are all longstanding antisemitic tropes.

However, while large majorities across all three age bands consider most of the remaining listed

⁴ See the working definition of antisemitism on the [website of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance](#).

Figure 11: Connections of Jewish Europeans to Israel, by age band (%)^{a,b}



Notes: ^a Question: G10a. Have you ever been to Israel? (Items as listed in the figure). Multiple responses possible. Question: G10b. Do you have any family or relatives living in Israel? 1. Yes, all or almost all of them; 2. Yes, many of them; 3. Yes, some of them; 4. No, none; 95. Don't know.
^b Proportions shown for 'have family or relatives living in Israel' combine response options 'yes, all or almost all of them', 'yes, many of them', 'yes, some of them' in QG10b.
 Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

statements to be antisemitic, young Jewish Europeans are least likely to do so. This is notably the case with all the statements relating to Israel (e.g. 'The world would be a better place without Israel'; 'Israelis behave "like Nazis" towards the Palestinians'; 'Supports boycotts of Israel or Israelis'; and 'criticises Israel'). Yet even in these instances, at least 70% of young Jewish Europeans regard them to be either 'definitely' or 'probably' antisemitic.

2.2. The place of Israel in the lives and identities of young Jewish Europeans

Israel features prominently in the lives and identities of young Jewish Europeans. 10 % hold Israeli citizenship, and one in fourteen of those who are married have an Israeli spouse. Moreover, most have a relationship with Israel: among those in the sample, nine in ten have visited the country, three-quarters have family there, and close to one in five have lived there for at least a year and/or were born there (Figure 11). While larger proportions of the two older cohorts may regard the notion of 'supporting Israel' to be an important component of their Jewish identities, three-quarters of young Jewish Europeans also hold this view (see Figure 8).


Understanding the place that the State of Israel plays in Jewish life is an important component of understanding contemporary antisemitism. At one level, the connections observed among young Jewish Europeans are personal – they are about familial or social ties with Israelis who live there. However, at a deeper level, we can see that for many, supporting Israel constitutes an important part of their Jewish identities – it is a key element in how they understand the very nature of their Jewishness.

2.3. When attitudes towards Israel become antisemitic

As a result, on occasions when the Arab-Israel conflict flares up, it encroaches on the lives of young Jews in Europe and can have a direct bearing on how safe young Jewish Europeans feel. Antisemitic incidents are known to spike during extended periods of conflict between Israel and its neighbours,⁵ and the FRA data clearly demonstrate that it affects young Jewish Europeans' feelings of safety. Indeed, just one in ten say that the Arab-Israel conflict has no impact on how safe they feel as a Jew living in their country; the remaining 90 % say it affects them at least a little, and 37 % say it affects them 'a great deal' (Figure 12).

⁵ See, for example, *Antisemitic Incidents Report 2018*, London: Community Security Trust, p.5; *Rapport sur l'antisémitisme en France*, Paris: Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive, p.27.


Figure 12: Extent to which the Arab-Israel conflict affects how safe Jewish Europeans feel as Jews living in Europe, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: B13. Does the Arab-Israeli conflict impact at all on how SAFE you feel as a Jewish person in [COUNTRY]? Items as listed in the figure.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Figure 13: Extent to which Jewish Europeans report that people in their countries accuse or blame them for anything done by the Israeli government because they are Jewish, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: B14. Do you ever feel that people in [Country] accuse or blame you for anything done by the Israeli government because you are Jewish? Items as listed in the figure.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Moreover, young Jewish Europeans are particularly likely to feel that people in their countries accuse or blame them for anything done by the Israeli government because they are Jewish. About 85 % report that this happens to them at least ‘occasionally,’ and close to a quarter say it happens to them ‘all the time’ (Figure 13). In this context, it is worth noting that recent Eurobarometer data show that, on average, 54 % of Europeans (rising to up to 85 % in the case of one country) see Jews in their country through the lenses of the Arab-Israel conflict.⁶

This is problematic. First, irrespective of whether any individual Jewish European happens to support, oppose, be neutral on, or indeed unaware of, any specific policies of the Israeli government, he or she is in no position to influence them. Second, and much more importantly, it is problematic because it is commonly experienced as an attack on their Jewishness: Jews are being singled out for blame solely because they are Jewish.

This partially explains why some young Jewish Europeans experience any criticism of Israel as at least ‘probably’ antisemitic, if not ‘definitely’ so. However, for the vast majority, general criticism of Israel is largely not regarded as antisemitic (Figure 14) – indeed, seven in ten young Jewish Europeans believe that when a

6 See Special Eurobarometer 484, Perceptions of antisemitism, 2019, pp. 43-45.


non-Jew criticises Israel, they are either probably or definitely not being antisemitic. Importantly, clear majorities in all age bands hold this view, but young Jewish Europeans are the most likely to feel such general criticism is acceptable.

Yet their views shift when criticism is expressed in a particularly hostile manner. Asked whether a non-Jewish person who supports boycotts of Israel or Israelis is antisemitic, over two-thirds of young Jewish Europeans answer either 'yes definitely' (36 %) or 'yes, probably' (34 %). Yet, again, they are found to be slightly more moderate on this issue than the older two cohorts, where the proportions giving either of the affirmative responses reach 80 % (Figure 15). The proportions rise even further when asked whether the contention that 'Israelis behave "like Nazis" towards

the Palestinians' is antisemitic. In this case, 80 % of young Jewish Europeans maintain that it is, either 'definitely' or 'probably' (see Figure 10).

To understand why this is the case, one needs to refer back to the data on the place of Israel in contemporary Jewish identity. Israel matters deeply and personally to many Jewish Europeans, including young adults, and therefore attacks on the country's legitimacy feel threatening. For many, such attacks are experienced not as understandable and reasonable forms of political activism, but rather as assaults on a country that, while mired in a prolonged ethno-political conflict, constitutes a safe haven for Jews from antisemitism, the cradle of Jewish civilisation, and an important component in how young Jewish Europeans understand their identities as Jews.


Figure 14: Extent to which Jewish Europeans feel that criticism of Israel is antisemitic or not, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: B17B. Would you consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she criticises Israel? (Items as listed in the figure).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Figure 15: Extent to which Jewish Europeans feel that supporting boycotts of Israel or Israelis is antisemitic or not, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: B17F. Would you consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she supports boycotts of Israel or Israelis (e.g. goods, products, university lecturers)? (Items as listed in the figure).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019



3

Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among young Jewish Europeans



KEY FINDINGS

- 81 % of the young Jewish Europeans surveyed say that antisemitism is a problem in their countries, and much the same proportion (83 %) believes it to have increased over the past five years. They are equally likely to feel the same way about racism in general. High proportions also regard intolerance towards Muslims as a growing concern.
- Young Jewish Europeans are likely to point to the internet and social media as the context in which antisemitism is most problematic today, and where an increase can most be seen in recent years. Close to 90 % of those surveyed hold these positions. Moreover, 70 % maintain that antisemitism in the media and expressions of hostility towards Jews in the street or other public places are either 'very big' or 'fairly big' problems.
- Young Jewish Europeans are considerably more likely to have experienced antisemitic harassment or violence than older Jewish respondents. Almost half (44 %) of those surveyed say they were a victim of at least one incident of antisemitic harassment in the twelve months before the survey, and 4 % report having experienced at least one incident involving antisemitic violence.
- Among the Young Jewish Europeans surveyed, victims of antisemitic harassment or violence are most likely to describe their assailant as 'someone with a Muslim extremist view'. Among young Jewish Europeans who have experienced antisemitic harassment, 31 % identify the perpetrator in this way; among those who have experienced violence, 59 % do so. Lower, but nonetheless significant proportions, also point to 'someone with a left-wing political view' and, to a lesser extent, 'someone with a right-wing political view'.
- 80 % of surveyed young Jewish Europeans who experienced an incident of antisemitic harassment, and 51 % of those who experienced an incident of antisemitic violence in the year prior to the survey, did not report it to an authority.

3.1. Perceptions of antisemitism

Having developed an understanding of who young Jewish Europeans are and what they consider to be antisemitic, to what extent do they believe antisemitism to be a problem in the countries in which they live?


Four in five young Jewish Europeans say that they consider antisemitism to be either a 'very big' or a 'fairly big' problem, much the same proportion as those who

take the same view about racism more generally. Young Jewish Europeans are also likely to point to intolerance towards Muslims as a problem in their countries (more so than crime, unemployment, government corruption and, importantly, immigration), and they are noticeably more likely to say this than the older two cohorts. Young Jewish Europeans identify intolerance towards Muslims as a 'very big' or 'fairly big' problem at somewhat lower rates than they do antisemitism or racism. This may be at least partially explained by the fact that the survey was conducted in some countries with very small

Muslim populations (e.g. Hungary, Poland), where the issue is rather less prominent than in other parts of Europe (Figure 16).

Young Jewish Europeans are somewhat less likely than older people to think that levels of antisemitism have increased in recent years (Figure 17), as is the case for racism (Figure 18). One possible explanation for this is

Figure 16: Proportions of Jewish Europeans saying various issues are a problem in their countries, by age band (%)^{a,b}




Notes: ^a Question: B02. To what extent do you think the following are a problem in [COUNTRY]? 1. A very big problem; 2. A fairly big problem; 3. Not a very big problem; 4. Not a problem at all; 95. Don't know.

^b Proportions shown for 'a very big problem' and 'a fairly big problem' combined.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Figure 17: Extent to which Jewish Europeans feel that antisemitism has increased or decreased in their countries over the past five years, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: B03. Over the past five years, have the following increased, stayed the same or decreased in [COUNTRY]? B. Antisemitism (Items as listed in the figure).


Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

that those in the older age bands have longer memories, and thus feel any change in recent years rather more acutely than younger people, for whom existing levels are perceived as normal. Yet the differences between the three age bands are quite small – most (between about 85 % and 90 %) within each age group believe that levels of antisemitism have increased. On the other hand, young Jewish Europeans are marginally *more* likely than the two older cohorts to feel that intolerance towards Muslims has increased ‘a lot’, although across all age bands about three-quarters perceive an increase to some degree (Figure 19).

Focusing on the contexts in which antisemitism is most problematic, it is striking to see all three age groups

point to ‘the internet, including social media’ as the stand-out issue (Figure 20). The two youngest age bands are more likely than the oldest one to say this, but all point to it as dominant. The same is the case for where Jews of all ages think antisemitism is increasing most – again, online antisemitism significantly outscores all other environments investigated (Figure 21). Interestingly, while young Jewish Europeans are more likely than the oldest age band to identify antisemitism as a problem in more or less every context measured, they tend to be less likely than the 60+ year-olds to feel that antisemitism has increased in most of them. Again, the differences are small, but striking nonetheless (Figure 20 and Figure 21).


Figure 18: Extent to which Jewish Europeans feel that racism has increased or decreased in their countries over the past five years, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: B03. Over the past five years, have the following increased, stayed the same or decreased in [COUNTRY]? A. Racism (Items as listed in the figure).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019


Figure 19: Extent to which Jewish Europeans feel that intolerance towards Muslims has increased or decreased in their countries over the past five years, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: B03. Over the past five years, have the following increased, stayed the same or decreased in [COUNTRY]? C. Intolerance to Muslims (Items as listed in the figure).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Figure 20: Proportions of Jewish Europeans saying various manifestations of antisemitism are a problem in their countries, by age band (%)^{a,b}



Notes: ^a Question: B04a. To what extent do you think the following are a problem in [COUNTRY]? Options as listed. 1. A very big problem; 2. A fairly big problem; 3. Not a very big problem; 4. Not a problem at all; 95. Don't know. ^b Proportions shown are for 'a very big problem' and 'a fairly big problem' combined.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

3.2. Experiences of antisemitism

Many of the differences in perceptions seen between the three age bands up to now are fairly small. The overarching sense is that the young Jews in the sample are strikingly similar to the older two cohorts. However, when it comes to actual experiences of antisemitism, the differences are stark. The younger Jews are, the more likely they are to experience antisemitism, irrespective of the form it takes.

Extraordinarily, close to half (45 %) of the young Jewish Europeans surveyed say they have been a victim of at least one antisemitic experience in the past twelve months. The proportions found among the older two cohorts are strikingly high too – one-third of 35-59-year-olds and one-fifth of 60-plus year-olds – but young people are clearly the most vulnerable group (Figure 22).


In the vast majority of cases, these experiences were cases of antisemitic harassment. The examples given in the question were antisemitic emails or text messages; offensive, threatening or silent phone calls experienced

as antisemitic; a person or people loitering, waiting for, or deliberately following the respondent in a threatening way that was experienced as antisemitic; offensive or threatening antisemitic comments made in person; offensive antisemitic gestures; or offensive antisemitic comments posted about the respondent on the internet, including social media. Thus, for most Jews experiencing antisemitism in Europe today, these are the types of incidents to which they are referring.

Nevertheless, cases of antisemitic violence and vandalism, while considerably less common, still register. Close to one in every twenty-five young Jewish Europeans surveyed said they had experienced an antisemitic physical attack in the past year, a noticeably higher proportion than either of the older age bands. The pattern with antisemitic vandalism is much the same – the proportions are more or less the same as for physical attacks, and again, they are sensitive to age in the same way.

Thus, as is the case with racism in general, it is young people who consistently appear to be most prone to experiencing some kind of antisemitic experience. To stress the key finding: close to half of the young Jewish

Figure 21: Proportions of Jewish Europeans saying various manifestations of antisemitism have increased over the past five years, by age band (%)^{a,b}



Notes: ^a Question: B04b. Over the past five years, have the following increased, stayed the same or decreased in [COUNTRY]? Options as listed on chart. 1. Increased a lot; 2. Increased a little; 3. Stayed the same; 4. Decreased a little; 5. Decreased a lot; 95. Don't know.

^b Proportions shown are for 'increased a lot' and 'increased a little' combined.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Europeans in our sample fell victim to at least one antisemitic experience – typically involving harassment – in the year prior to the survey.


Asked how they could be sure that the incident was antisemitic, victims were most likely to point to two key indicators. They could be identified as Jewish, for example due to the clothing they were wearing or some other visible indicator; and/or the perpetrator used antisemitic language. In addition, some noted that it was about when the event took place – for example, on the Sabbath or a Jewish holiday, or on a day of significance for the offender (e.g. a memorial day). However, most commonly, young Jewish Europeans reported that it happened during a period of tension or conflict in Israel – times well-established in antisemitic incident data for spikes in antisemitism worldwide (Figure 23). This was the case for four in ten of the young victims of antisemitic harassment.

Asking respondents to identify the perpetrators of antisemitic harassment they had experienced helps

provide a clearer idea about the nature of contemporary antisemitism in Europe. One group stands out in particular – across all age bands, and most commonly among the youngest one, victims of harassment described their perpetrator as ‘someone with a Muslim extremist view’ (Figure 24). Almost a third (31 %) of young victims reported this. ‘Someone with a left-wing political view’ is also common – about one in five (21 %) said this. This is rather more than the 14 % who pointed to ‘someone with a right-wing political view’. That all three of these feature as prominently as they do provides some sense of the ethno-political nature of antisemitism – i.e. that it commonly comes from those with political agendas, most likely drawing on anti-Israel views, or from a more traditional ‘anti-foreigner’ perspective.

At the same time, a quarter (24 %) of the young Jewish Europeans who had experienced at least one incident of antisemitic harassment in the twelve months prior to the survey pointed to ‘teenagers or a group of teenagers’ as the perpetrators. We also see that these incidents were

Figure 22: Proportions of Jewish Europeans who have experienced various forms of antisemitism over the past twelve months, by age band (%)^{a,b,c,d,e}



- Notes:
- ^a Prevalence of antisemitic victimisation was derived from the series of detailed questions, relating to various experiences of harassment (in the form of emails, phone calls, loitering and waiting, personal comments, gestures or comments on the Internet) as well as experiences of vandalism and/or physical attack in the past 12 months and specifically due to the fact of victim's Jewishness.
 - ^b Data on antisemitic harassment: Co4aA, Co4bA, Co4aB, Co4bB, Co4aC, Co4bC, Co4aD, Co4bD, Co4aE, Co4bE, Co4aF, Co4bF.
 - ^c Data on antisemitic vandalism: Do4a, Do4b.
 - ^d Data on antisemitic physical attack: D12a, D12b.
 - ^e The following example gives an idea of the general form in which a question of antisemitic victimisation is asked: Do3. In the past 12 months, has your home, car, or other property ever been deliberately damaged or vandalised, for example with graffiti? 0. Never; 1. Once; 2. Twice; 3. 3-4 times; 4. 6-10 times; 5. More than 10 times; 95. Don't know; and Do4a and Do4b. And did this incident/any of these incidents happen in the past 12 months because you are Jewish? 1. Yes; 2. No; 95. Don't know.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

quite commonly perpetrated by someone known to the victim – notably, a ‘work or school/college colleague’ (24 %). These results are particularly striking when examined by age, because young Jewish Europeans were much more likely to point to either of these than the two older cohorts. It is not possible to say for certain why this is, but one can certainly hypothesise based on recent research. Existing evidence shows that Jewish university students – especially those involved in some way in student politics – are known to be particularly susceptible to antisemitic harassment from their fellow students, often expressed in the form of anti-Israel discourse. As Table 2 in the Annex demonstrates, over half of the young Jewish Europeans in this sample are students.⁷ Such highly politicised university environments, often fuelled by staunchly leftist

political agendas, can feel acutely uncomfortable, and indeed antisemitic, for many of them.⁸

While violent physical antisemitism is comparatively rare, the perpetrators of such attacks are found to be rather similar. One group again stands out above all others – ‘someone with a Muslim extremist view’ – identified by close to six in ten of young Jewish victims in the sample. The proportions of perpetrators with left-wing or right-wing political views were rather similar to one another (17 % and 14 %), and both were lower than the proportion found for ‘teenager or group of teenagers’ (27 %).

⁷ See, for example, Boyd, J. (2016), *Searching for community: A portrait of undergraduate Jewish students in five UK cities*, London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, pp. 12-14.


⁸ See National Union of Students, *The experience of Jewish students in 2016-17*. For recently published in-depth analyses of left-wing antisemitism, see Rich, D. (2016), *The Left's Jewish Problem: Jeremy Corbyn, Israel and Antisemitism*, London: Birkbeck; and Hirsch, D. (2018), *Contemporary Left Antisemitism*, Oxford: Routledge.

3.3. Reporting

There is a low level of reporting of cases of antisemitic harassment – namely those involving offensive or threatening comments, gestures, text messages, social media posts, phone calls, loitering and the like. Indeed, among young Jewish Europeans who have experienced such incidents, four in five cases are not reported to any authority. Of the few incidents of harassment that

are reported, young people were found to be rather more likely to report them to ‘another organisation’ as opposed to the police – perhaps a Jewish community monitoring body, or the appropriate individual or office in the workplace or at an educational institution (Figure 25). One should not be surprised that so few of these incidents are reported – cases of racial harassment are not commonly seen as hate crimes – so in the minds of many, including victims, they are

Figure 23: Indicators enabling victims to determine that the most serious incident involving harassment that they had experienced in the past five years was antisemitic, by age band (%)^{a,b}



^a Question: Cnewd01-10. Did any of the following apply to the incident? Please select as many as apply. (Items as listed in the figure).


^b Out of those who have experienced antisemitic harassment in the past five years; n = 1,584 (16-34); 2,919 (35-59); 1,983 (60+).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

not considered serious enough to merit formal report. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the scale of this type of harassment – based on this evidence, official figures miss most of it. By contrast, cases of physical

antisemitism, while rare, are rather more likely to be reported. However, even in these instances, about half of the young victims of such assaults do not report them to the police or any other authority.

Figure 24: Perpetrators of most serious incident of antisemitic harassment, according to the victims, by age band (%)^{a,b}




^a Question: Co6. Who did this to you? Please select as many as apply. Response options as listed on chart.

^b Out of those who have experienced antisemitic harassment in the past five years; n = 1,584 (16-34); 2,919 (35-59); 1,983 (60+).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019



Figure 25: Reporting patterns of antisemitic harassment, by age band (%)^{a,b}




Notes: ^a Question: Co8. Did you or anyone else report this incident to the police or to any other organisation? Items as listed in the figure.

^b Out of those who have experienced antisemitic harassment in the past five years; n = 1,584 (16-34); 2,919 (35-59); 1,983 (60+).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Figure 26: Frequencies with which Jewish Europeans in different age bands avoid wearing, carrying or displaying things that might help people recognise them as Jewish in public (%)^{a,b}



Notes: ^a Question: Fo8. Do you ever avoid wearing, carrying or displaying things that might help people recognise you as a Jew in public? 1. Never; 2. Occasionally; 3. Frequently; 4. All the time.

^b Out of those who ever wear, carry or display such items; n = 1,630 (16-34); 3,465 (35-59); 3,330 (60+).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

simply hold no particular meaning to them. Upon examination, close to half (45 %) of the young Jewish Europeans who do not wear, carry or display these items choose not to because they are concerned that doing so may adversely affect their safety. This is certainly a reasonable concern – FRA data from both the 2013 and 2018 surveys demonstrate that people who are identifiably Jewish are more likely to experience antisemitic harassment, vandalism and violence than Jews who cannot be easily identified as such.

Examining the responses of Jews who do wear, carry or display these items, at least on occasion, and curb their practice in some way, we find that young Jewish Europeans are slightly more likely to do this “all the time” than the middle age band which, in turn, is slightly more likely to do so than the oldest group (Figure 26). The distinctions are small, but one can see somewhat heightened levels of anxiety among the youngest band. However, these differences largely disappear between the youngest and the middle cohorts when one examines the proportions who hide their Jewishness at least on occasion – in both age bands, about three-quarters feel the need to do this. Clearly, many Jews in Europe experience times when they do not feel safe wearing their Jewishness publicly.


An alternative measure of anxiety can be found in any tendency among Jews to avoid certain places or locations in their local area or neighbourhood because they don’t feel safe there as a Jew. In understanding the data on this, it is worth noting that, in many cases, Jews cluster in quite specific geographic areas – particular the most observant or communally engaged among

them. This is partly because they need to live in close proximity to community facilities such as a synagogue or shops selling kosher goods, and partly because of the social benefits of living close to others with whom they have cultural and religious traditions in common. This ‘strength in numbers’ factor may help to increase feelings of security at the local level. However, this geographical clustering is not the case everywhere. While it is particularly common in the United Kingdom, Jews in Germany are much more thinly dispersed across the country. In France, while Jewish geographical clustering is common, many Jews live in quite strong mixed Jewish-Muslim neighbourhoods and recent tensions have sometimes had an adverse effect on Jewish people’s feelings of security in such areas.

Examining the data, we find that most Jews, across all three age bands, report that they ‘never’ avoid certain places or locations in their local area or neighbourhood because they do not feel safe there as Jews (Figure 27). However, significant minorities do act in this way, at least occasionally, and those in the youngest age band are most likely to do so. This may be because many young Jews are students or at the early stages of their careers and therefore live in lower income areas or city centres more prone to violence, whereas older Jews, with families, are more likely to live in quieter suburban areas.⁹

⁹ 20 % of 16-34 year-olds report living in the suburbs or outskirts of a big city, compared with 28 % and 29 % of 35-59 and 60+ year-olds, whereas 67 % of 16-34 year-olds report living in the capital city/a big city, compared with 56 % and 50 % of 35-59 and 60+ year-olds (question G12).

Figure 27: Proportions of Jewish Europeans in different age bands who avoid certain places or locations in their local area or neighbourhood because they do not feel safe there as a Jew (%)^a



Notes: ^a Question: B25. Do you ever avoid certain places or locations in your local area or neighbourhood because you don't feel safe there as a Jew? Items as listed in the figure.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Younger Jews are also more likely than the older two cohorts to have moved out of their neighbourhood because they do not feel safe living there as a Jew. However, the proportions doing this are fairly small: 6 % in the case of the youngest group, compared to 5 % (middle cohort) and 2 % (oldest cohort). Thus while many (44 % of young Jewish Europeans) have experienced at least one incident involving antisemitic harassment in the previous year, few (6 %) have felt compelled to move out of their local area as a result of it, or of more general feelings of insecurity. However, among those who have not taken this step, 7 % have considered doing so because they do not feel safe as Jews, and of these, approaching half of them (42 %) have made active plans to move. Bringing these figures together, we find that one in every seven or eight young Jewish Europeans feels sufficiently unsafe to have either moved out of the neighbourhood in which they lived, or to have made active plans to do so, or to have contemplated it.

One of the strongest possible indicators of anxiety is migration. When Jews are really concerned about levels of antisemitism in their country, they may begin to explore the possibility of leaving and going to live abroad. Evidence of this can be found most clearly in recent patterns of migration to Israel among French Jews: between 1995 and 2012, the numbers of Jews taking this step each year fluctuated between about 1,000 and 2,500, averaging out at about 1,750 per annum. However, they rose to 2,900 in 2013, before spiking dramatically in 2014 and 2015 at well over 6,000


each year.¹⁰ While numbers have declined since, they have remained considerably above the average level found in the 1990s and 2000s. It is highly probable that the dominant force driving this spike was antisemitism. Islamist attacks on a Jewish school in Toulouse in March 2012 and a kosher supermarket in Paris in January 2015 were the two most deadly incidents among several other violent ones during that period that prompted many French Jews to consider their futures in the country.

Nevertheless, while the numbers leaving for Israel from France at that time were high, they only constituted 1.4 % of the total Jewish population of the country in a given year at their peak, and about 5.5 % of the total Jewish population over the past six years.¹¹ Thus, the vast majority of French Jews have not taken this step. And, in understanding these figures, there are a number of factors to bear in mind. First, the figures quoted thus far are only for France, not Europe as a whole. The numbers of Jews migrating to Israel per annum from the next three largest Jewish populations in Europe – the United Kingdom, Germany and Hungary – are much lower, and have been largely stable for many years. On the other hand, these figures relate only to migration to Israel; there are scant data on how many European Jews have emigrated to other countries, either within Europe or beyond. Additionally, while antisemitism almost certainly prompted the spike in migration from France in 2014 and 2015, people emigrate for multiple reasons,

¹⁰ These data, and all those relating to migration to Israel in this report, are from Israel's [Central Bureau of Statistics](#).

¹¹ For a more detailed assessment of this issue, see Staetsky, D. (2017), *Are Jews leaving Europe?*, London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

Figure 28: Proportions of Jewish Europeans who have considered emigrating from the country in which they currently live out of fear for their safety as Jews, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: B26. In the past 5 years, have you considered emigrating from [Country] because you don't feel safe living there as a Jew? Items as listed in the figure.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

only one of which is fear of persecution, harassment or violence. Other common drivers include economic, personal or professional factors. Thus, determining the factors motivating migration in any specific case is important to fully understand what is going on.

Yet as Figure 28 demonstrates, the proportions of European Jews in our sample saying they have contemplated emigrating from their country out of fears for their safety as Jews are much higher than those who have actually emigrated, to Israel at least: indeed, four in ten (41 %) of all young Jewish Europeans claim to have considered taking this step. This is a very similar proportion to that found for the middle age band, and significantly higher than that found for the 60-plus group, an unsurprising finding as younger people are generally considerably more likely to migrate than older people.

The large discrepancy between the proportions who have actually migrated and the proportions contemplating doing so might be explained by the fact that the migration data quoted thus far relate only to migration to Israel. However, this hypothesis is unlikely. The survey invited those who said they had considered migrating to answer two further questions: have the made active plans to do so, and, if so, to which country are they contemplating going? A third of all young Jewish Europeans who have considered migrating out of fears of antisemitism have made plans to do so, and of these, two-thirds see Israel as their preferred destination (Figure 29). By contrast, only about one in ten said they intended to remain within one of the countries of the European Union. In short, based on these numbers,

we can conclude that about one in seven of the young Jewish Europeans in our sample is making active plans to emigrate because of antisemitism, and most of these people see Israel as their most probable destination. Given current known levels of migration to Israel, not all will act on these plans, but the data nonetheless tell us something of the current psyche of many Jewish Europeans. At the very least, we can read them as highly notable levels of concern about antisemitism in Europe today.


4.2. Is enough being done to combat antisemitism?

The obvious, and most immediately dangerous, threat to Jewish communities comes from terrorism. All of the deadliest attacks on Jewish targets in recent years in Europe – in Toulouse, Paris, Brussels and Copenhagen – have involved Islamist terrorists. In response, several European governments have been quick to bolster security around Jewish sites, and many Jews in the sample appear to recognise that. About half of young Jewish Europeans maintain that their country's government is either 'definitely' or 'probably' responding adequately to the security needs of Jewish communities. However, they were less likely than either of the older cohorts to say this, and most likely not to know either way. At the same time, only 17 % of young Jewish Europeans think that their government combats antisemitism effectively (Figure 31), and again, young people are more critical of their governments in this respect than the older two cohorts.

Examining these two assessments together, it is striking to see the differences in Jewish people’s views of their governments’ actions. Like the other two age cohorts, young Jewish Europeans are much more likely to praise their governments for the efforts they have made to respond to the community’s security needs, than they are to do so for their more general attempts to combat antisemitism. This contrast is worthy of note: it indicates

that Jews believe their governments are rather better at dealing with the immediate threats of terrorism or attack by protecting Jewish sites and buildings, than they are at combating the underlying problem of antisemitism itself. Clearly, for young Jewish Europeans to feel safe and secure in Europe today, much more needs to be done to address the types of antisemitism they both perceive around them, and commonly experience.


Figure 29: Preferred country/area of Jewish emigration, by age band (%)^{a,b}



Notes: ^a Question: B26b. To which country? - Consider emigrating/made active preparations for emigrating.
^b Out of those who are both considering emigrating due to fears of antisemitism and have made some active plans to do so; n = 433 (16-34); 1,021 (35-59); 534 (60+).

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019


Figure 30: Extent to which Jewish Europeans think their country’s government responds adequately to the security needs of Jewish communities, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: B17b. Do you think the [Country] government responds adequately to the security needs of Jewish communities? Items as listed in the figure.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Figure 31: Extent to which Jewish Europeans think their country’s government combats antisemitism effectively, by age band (%)^a



Note: ^a Question: B17a. Do you think the [Country] government combats antisemitism effectively? Items as listed in the figure.

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019



Annex

This study is based on data drawn for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights's (FRA) second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU. Full methodological details can be found in the FRA report published in 2018.¹² In brief, a consortium of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) and Ipsos, both based in the United Kingdom, managed the survey data collection under the supervision of FRA staff. Data were collected through an open online survey, which was available for respondents to complete for seven weeks in May and June 2018. 16,395 self-identifying Jewish respondents (aged 16 or over) took part, from 12 EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. The survey was also conducted in Latvia, where a further 200 respondents participated, but methodological changes applied in order to attract Latvian respondents limited the scope for comparisons to be drawn between Latvia and the other survey countries. As a result, the data from Latvia were removed from the dataset deposited by FRA at the GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, upon which this study is based.

According to the most recent demographic assessments, of the 14.6 million Jews in the world today, 1.35 million Jews live in Europe, 1.1 million of whom are based in the 28 Member States of the European Union.¹³ Europe is thus home to 9.2 % of the global Jewish population, and the EU is home to 7.4 % of it. Most of the world's Jewish population today (84 %) lives in just two countries: Israel and the United States of America.

While precise age distributions across the whole of Europe are uncertain, Europe's Jewish population today is known to have a top-heavy age structure, with higher proportions in the oldest age bands than the youngest ones. Younger people tend to be underrepresented in social surveys in general, but the demographic realities of European Jews are partially reflected in the response patterns to the FRA survey in 2018: 17 % of the sample is comprised of 16-34 year-olds (N=2,707), compared to 41 % in the 35-59 age bracket (N=6,653) and 43 % in the 60-plus one (N=7,035). Unless otherwise stated, these are the Ns for all charts that appear in this report.

In EU policy, young people are defined as being between 15 and 29 years old. For the purposes of this report, the category has been altered slightly for two main reasons. First, at the younger end, respondents needed to be 16 years old to participate. Second, one of the most commonly used indicators of Jewish community engagement and involvement

relates to their marriage patterns – specifically the decision of whether to marry someone Jewish or not. By extending the top end of the age band to 34 years, we were able to include many more individuals who were married, thereby allowing us to develop a better understanding of the nature of their Jewishness, particularly when compared to the older two age cohorts.

The numerical and proportionate breakdowns of the sample of young Jewish Europeans by country can be seen in [Table 1](#), alongside the total number of respondents to the survey and the estimated Jewish population size for each of the participating EU Member States.

As can be seen, 57.3 % of all respondents aged 16-34 are based in three countries – the United Kingdom, France and Germany – which are home to the three largest Jewish populations in Europe. However, the proportions do not fully reflect the known distribution of the Jewish population of Europe. The French Jewish population as a whole is about 50 % larger than the United Kingdom's Jewish population, which, in turn, is two-and-a-half times the size of the German Jewish population, and respondent numbers are somewhat out of kilter with these known proportions. Moreover, given that the Hungarian Jewish population is estimated to be at least three times the size of the Swedish Jewish population, it is surprising to see the young Swedes in our sample outnumber the young Hungarians by three to one. However, insufficient data exist across the countries involved in this study to determine accurately what the distribution should be when focusing exclusively on 16-34-year-olds. As a result, in this analysis, the data have not been weighted in any way. The findings, therefore, should be understood as the views of communally connected 16-34-year-old Jews living in the EU Member States involved in this survey. Determining the extent to which they represent all Jewish Europeans aged 16-34 is impossible. Yet the size of the sample – 2,707 responses – makes this the largest study of young Jewish Europeans ever conducted. In the absence of baseline data with which to weight the sample, its primary credibility comes from its scale and coverage.

Looking at the main social demographic characteristics of the sample of young Jewish Europeans, it is worth noting in particular that over half (56 %) reported that they had been attending school or university in the twelve months prior to the survey, which gives greater credence to some of the findings relating to experiences of antisemitism in such contexts. Unsurprisingly for a sample in this age band, about two-thirds (64 %) have never been married. In general, the sample is balanced in terms of gender, and the age distributions are reasonably equally distributed across the four bands shown, although the youngest group (16-19-year-olds, which is a smaller band than the other three insofar as it covers four years rather than five) would appear to be underrepresented.

12 FRA (2018), *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism: second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU*, Luxembourg, Publications Office.

13 DellaPergola, S. (2019), *World Jewish Population, 2018*. Current Jewish Population Reports. Berman Jewish Databank, in cooperation with the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry.

Table 1: Distribution of respondents to the 2018 FRA survey on experiences and perceptions of antisemitism in the EU, by country of residence

EU Member State	No. of respondents aged 16-34	Proportions of 16-34-year-old sample (%)	Total no. of respondents in FRA survey	Estimated Jewish population size, 2018 ^a
Austria	111	4.1	526	9,000
Belgium	149	5.5	785	29,200
Denmark	138	5.1	592	6,400
France	436	16.1	3,869	453,000
Germany	397	14.7	1,233	116,000
Hungary	61	2.3	590	47,400
Italy	112	4.1	682	27,500
Netherlands	131	4.8	1,202	29,800
Poland	138	5.1	422	4,500
Spain	113	4.2	570	11,700
Sweden	204	7.5	1,193	15,000
United Kingdom	717	26.5	4,731	290,000
Total	2,707	100.0	16,395	1,039,500

Note: ^a The numbers in this column are the size of the 'core' Jewish population – i.e. people who self-identify as Jewish in censuses or social surveys. See DellaPergola (2019), *op. cit.*

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019

Table 2: Main social demographic characteristics of the sample of 16-34-year-old Jewish Europeans

		%	N
Gender	Female	49.5	1,340
	Male	49.6	1,344
	Other	0.8	23
	Total	100	2,707
Age	16-19	13.7	372
	20-24	28.6	775
	25-29	27.0	732
	30-34	30.6	828
	Total	100	2,707
Educational level	No tertiary education	41.7	1,130
	Tertiary education	55.5	1,503
	Prefer not to say	2.7	74
	Total	100	2,707
Attended school or university in past 12 months	Yes	55.6	1,506
	No	44.4	1,201
	Total	100	2,707
Employment status	Employed full-time	42.8	1,159
	Employed part-time	10.9	296
	Not in employment	46.3	1,252
	Total	100	2,707
Marital status	Married or in a registered partnership	31.1	843
	Married but separated	0.6	15
	Divorced	1.0	27
	Never married	64.4	1,744
	Prefer not to say	2.9	78
	Total	100	2,707
Residence location	A capital city/a big city	67.0	1,814
	The suburbs or outskirts of a big city	19.6	530
	A town or a small city	10.5	284
	A country village or other	2.9	79
	Total	100	2,707

Source: GESIS Data Archive, ZA7491, 2019



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


HELPING TO MAKE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS A REALITY FOR EVERYONE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION


Based on FRA's second large-scale survey on experiences and perceptions of antisemitism, this report focuses on the perspectives of young Jewish Europeans (aged 16-34) living in twelve EU Member States. It first describes this particular group and takes a look at defining antisemitism and understanding the place of Israel in it. The report then presents young Jewish Europeans' experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Finally, it specifically looks at how safe young Jewish Europeans feel, and whether they believe governments are effectively combating antisemitism.



Hate crime



Hate speech



Equality



Non-discrimination

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